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IN THE

~UPREME

COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PARK CITY UTAH CORPORATION,
a corporation, and CITY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
a corporation,

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Plaintiffs-Respondents
v.
ENSIGN COMPANY, a limited
partnership,

Civil No. 15410

Defendant-Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
Initially it should be noted that respondents have
made no attempt to meet most of appellant's arguments.

Thus

appellant argued in its Main Brief at 12-15 that it cannot be
bound by an order of which it had no notice.

Respondents' only

response was to assert (erroneously) that appellant failed to
raise the issue below (Resp. Br. 24).

Appellant argued the

rn9~

ing of the Judgment on Stipulation of July 23, 1971, on which all
subsequent proceedings were based, in its Main Brief at length
because of its importance.

(App. Main Br. at 18-30).

never mention the meaning of that crucial document.

Respondent:
Appellant

argued that the April 8, 1975 "order" is without factual sup~rt
in the Record.

(App. Main Br. at 31-35) .

Respondents failed to

point to any specific portions of the Record which support the
"order."

Appellant argued that the April 8, 1975 "order•·
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violated its due process rights by failing to afford appellant
notice and hearing.

(App. Main Br. at 35-37)

Respondents

ignored this entirely.
Despite respondents' failure to join argument on the
merits appellant believes a Reply Brief is necessary to (a)
refute respondents' main contention that the April 8, 1975 "order"
was a final order from which appellant did not timely appeal,

(b)

refute certain factual assertions made by respondents that are
without specific Record support, and (c) briefly respond to
respondents' arguments on the merits of the judgment from which
appellant appeals.
I.

THE APRIL 8, 1975 "ORDER" WAS NOT FINAL AND HENCE
WAS NOT APPEALABLE.
The bulk of respondents' argument (Resp. Br. 9-17) is

devoted to the proposition that the April 8, 1975, ''order" should
have been appealed or preserved for appeal (by filing a notice of
intention to appeal) within 30 days of its entry.

While respond-

ents sometimes misconceive this argument as involving the
principle of res judicata~(Resp. Br. 10) the basic issue involved is whether the April 8, 1975 "order" was final within the
meaning of Rule 72(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The issue of finality revolves around two Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rules 72(a) and 54(b).

The two rules are but

opposite sides of the same coin, implementing this Court's longstanding policy against hearing appeals piecemeal.
~/Res

Downey

Rule 72(a),

judicata is aptly illustrated by Krofcheck v.
580 P.2d 243 (Utah 1978) •

State~nk,
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governing appeals as of right (as opposed to discretionary appea]
from interlocutory orders), provides that appeals lie "from all
final orders and judgments .

"

types of final orders and judgments.

Rule 72(a) recognizes two
The first and most obvious

is the judgment or order that wholly terminates the proceedings i:
the lower court.

Such an order or judgment is final because

nothing remains to be done in the lower court.

If he desires

review, an appellant must timely file a notice of appeal.
The second type of final judgment Rule 72 (a) recognizes
is one that wholly terminates certain claims in an action even
though other claims remain to be determined.

In that case, the

judgment is nevertheless final with regard to the claims wholly
determined, and an appellant, to preserve his right of appeal,
must timely file a notice of intent to appeal after determination
of the remaining claims.

A judgment or order disposing of w~

claims while others remain to be determined is not, however, finai
unless the lower court makes a specific finding that there isoo
just reason for delay and expressly directs the entry of a fiwl
judgment.

Rule 54(b) provides:

Judgment Upon Multiple Claims and/or Involving Multiple
Parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry
of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than
all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination by the court that there is no just reason
for delay and upon an express direction for the entry
of judgment.
In the absence of such determination and
direction, any order or other form of decision, however
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designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than
all the parties shall not terminate the action as to
any of the claims or parties, and the order or other
form of decision is ~ubject to ~evision at any time
before the entry of JUdgment adJudicating all the
claims and the rights and liabilities of all the
parties.
(emphasis supplied)
Rule 54(b) also makes it plain that the term "claim"
as used in Rule 72(a) means a claim for relief or cause of action.
Thus, the April 8, 1975 "order" cannot be final within
the meaning of Rule 72(a).

It was not a final judgment or

order of the first type because it did not completely terminate
the proceedings in the lower court.

It was not a final judgment

or order of the second type because it did not wholly dispose of
one claim and, furthermore, the lower court did not make the
express determination required by Rule 54(b) for such an order
or judgment to be final.
The nonfinality of the April 8, 1975 "order" is
dramatically accented by Judge Leary's order of June 21, 1977
in which he restrained the issuance of executions until after
notice and hearing, and restrained the sheriff from executing
on defendant's property until a proper money judgment had been
entered, after notice of hearing.
Thus as of June 21, 1977, the April 8, 1975, "order"
was at best an order determining liability alone reserving the
question of amount.

Such an order is not final.

Wheatland Irr.

Dist. v. Two Bar-Muleshoe Water Co., 431 P. 2d 257 (Wyo. 1967);
Texas Pacific Oil co. v. A.D. Jone Estate, Inc., 78 N.M. 348,

-4-
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431 P.2d 490 (1967); Clear v. Marvin, 83 Idaho 399, 363 P.2d

355

(1961); Tuscon Telco Federal Credit Union v. Bowser, 6 Ar1z.App,
·
10, 429 P.2d 501, reh. den., 6 Ariz.App. 190, 431 P.2r'l 85 (1%]);
Hontz v. White, 58 Wash.2d 538, 348 P.2d 420 (1960).

see~

v. Smith, 17 Utah 2d 65, 404 P.2d 659 (1965), in which this Court
granted an interlocutory appeal under Rule 72(b) of a summary
judgment on liability alone, recognizing that summary judgments
on liability alone are interlocutory in nature.
April 8,

Whatever the

"order" and the order of June 21, 1977 taken together

may be called, their effect is precisely identical to a summary
judgment on the issue of liability alone."!!/ Indeed, Rule 56{c)
itself classifies a summary judgment on the issue of liability
alone as interlocutory:
A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may
be rendered on the issue of liability alone, although
there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(emphasis added)
Thus the April 8 "order" as modified by the June 21 order was
"interlocutory in character" and was not appealable.
In the federal system, which, like Utah, has a policy
against piecemeal review, determinations of liability reserving
the issue of damages are not final and not appealable.

~

~/similarly, an order determining liability and
requiring an accounting as to amount of damages has long been
considered nonfinal.
Standard Steam Laundry v. Dole, 20 Utah
469, 58 P. 1109 (1899).
See Attorney General v. Pomeroy, 93 r'
Utah 426, 73 P.2d 1277 (1937), approving Standard Steam La~
v. Dole, supra, and disapproving Wheelwright v. Roman, 50 U
10, 165 P-:-513 (1917).
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v.

Un~ted States,

324 U.S. 229 (1945); Petrol Corp. v. Petroleum

Heat & Power Co., 162 F.2d 327
Burnett, 262 F.2d 55

(2d Cir. 1947); United States v.

(9th Cir. 1959).

The April 8, 1975 "order" was not final.
was not final,

Because it

the appellants were not required to file a notice

of appeal or notice of intent to appeal under Rule 72(a).
The real question confronted by this appeal is not the
finality of the April 8, 1975 "order,tt but its validity both in
terms of whether it correctly interpreted the earlier Judgment
on Stipulation and whether it was entered in violation of
appellant's due process rights.

Respondents have not even

mentioned these issues.
II.

RESPONDENTS' ASSERTIONS OF FACT SHOULD BE EXAMINED
IN LIGHT OF THE RECORD.
Counsel for appellant must call this Court's attention

to respondents' misstatements of the Record and vague citations
to it.

A typical example of respondents' treatment of the Record

is found on page 3 of Respondents' Brief where the Record citation reads "Record:
to March 1, 1975."

All documentation during period August 1971,
This reference is to hundreds of pages.

The

supposed "facts" said to be supported by this reference are (1)
that appellant was in default of the July 23, 1971 Judgment on
Stipulation,

(2) that appellant allowed funds belonging to

respondents to be used for appellant's own benefit, and (3) that
these funds amounted to at least $200,000.

Not only does the

Record fail to support these assertions, it specifically shows
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that respondents' attempts to establish these positions before
the lower court were failures.

After presentation to the

lo~r

court, Judge Harding found on November 6, 1974, that
[i]t is not shown that the [appellants] have received
any proceeds from third-party purchasers which should
have been applied to discharge the obligation sued
upon in the aforesaid foreclosure actions .
. or
that any such proceeds had been diverted to other
channels.
(R. 405, App. 38) .
Respondents next attempted to establish their factual
assertions by filing the affidavit of Robert Major (R. 441-598)
and causing a hearing to be held on February 27, 1975.

But as

appellant has pointed out (App. Main Br. 31-34), Judge

Hardi~

properly determined that the affidavit and Major's testimony were
incompetent hearsay and ruled only that more discovery was in
order.

Thus respondents'

factual assertions upon examination

turn out to be just assertions, without basis in the Record.d
Another example is respondents' assertion (Resp. Br. 5!
that pursuant to the April 8, 1975 "order" the current
amount due was determined.
citation for this statement.

mone~cy

Understandably, there is no Record
The terms of the April 8 "order"

required defendants to "certify in writing to this court". the
amount currently due or upon failure of defendants so to certify,
that the amounts certified by the purchase money obligees "s~ll
be taken as correct"

(R. 800-801, App. 59-60).

The Record

contains no such certification.

~/Respondents on p. 11 of their Brief once again repeat
this assertion without citations.
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REPLY TO SPECIFIC REFUTATIONS.

III.

As noted above, at pp. 1-2, Respondents have, with only
minor exceptions, failed to argue the merits of this appeal.
Respondents specifically meet appellant's argument on only two
points.

The first is whether appellant had notice of the July 23,

1971 Stipulation on Judgment.

The second is whether appellant's

factual recitation are material.
A.

Appellant Did Raise Lack of Notice Timely.
Contrary to respondents' assertion, appellant

properly raised in the lower court its lack of knowledge of the
Stipulation on Judgment (R. 812-815, esp. 814-815, App. 64-67,
esp. 67).

Thus this issue is not being raised for the first time

on appeal.
B.

Respondents' Argument That the Pacts Are
Immaterial Misses the Point.
Respondents, beginning on p. 24 of their Brief,

attempt to dismiss the facts recited by appellant as iromaterial.
The facts, respondents say, are immaterial because the issue was
decided adversely to appellant below after ''evidentiary hearings"
(Resp. Br. 26) or ''full evidentiary hearings" (Resp. Br. 27).
This Court should notice that respondents do not
use the word "trial," and correctly so for no trial was ever held.
Similarly,

"evidentiary hearing" and "full evidentiary hearing"

are misnomers.

As the Record reflects, what actually happened by

way of "evidentiary hearings" is that respondents obtained an order
to show cause, which was thereafter brought on for hearing, at
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which time respondent

(Krofcheck)

alone testified.

,\ddi tiona]]
J•

the files of this case were offered as evidence.

The result ,,, 2 ;

a finding that respondents had proved no material fact and an
order dismissing the order to show (R.

404-405; App. 37-39).

The next event below \"'as a December 8,

1974 motion by

respondents "to have final decrees herein enforced''
App.

53),

(R. 601,

in support of which Major's affidavit was filed.

motion was called up, and,

That

as set forth in appellant's t1ain Brie:

at 32, Major's attempt at that hearing to repeat his hearsay
affidavit was abruptly terminated by the trial court (Tr. 10).
These were the "full evidentiary hearings."
they were not trials.

Manifest:

Equally manifest is the fact that

t~y

were not "full evidentiary hearings" but were instead summary
hearings on respondents' motions during which respondents offen:
evidence the court below expressly found to be insufficient

~

support the motions.
Apparently respondents so characterize these
in an attempt to shift from the summary judgment rule

heari~s

(the movi:

party having to show affirmatively that there is no genuine issJ'
of fact)

to the rule governing this Court's review of factual

findings upon trial
to the victor below)

(viewing the evidence in the light favorabl:
There never having been a trial or a "tu:

evidentiary hearing" below,
(Resp.

Br.

25-26)

the authority cited by respondents

is inappropriate.
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CONCLUSION
The whole point of this appeal is to afford appellant
the ··full evidentiary hearing" that it was denied by the Sllil'.rnary

judgment entered against it.

Appellant is now before this Court

beco.use the lower court entered an ex parte "order'' purporting to
determine appellant's liability without notice to appellant and
without a hearing.

The district judges who were subsequently

involved in the case could not overrule a fellow district judge,
and ultimately converted the April 8, 1975 "order" into the
sum~ary

judg~ent

from which this appeal is taken.

This Court

is not foreclosed by a district judge's "order" and has the power,
and indeed the duty,

to set aside the April 8, 1975

~order"

and

subsequent sumnary judgment so that this case can be determined
on its merits after due notice to all parties.
Respectfully submitted,

warren Patten
Charles B. Casper
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
E. Bennett
370 East 5th South
salt LaY.e City, Utah 84111

~endell

Attorneys for Appellant
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